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Este documento considera una eventual zona de libre comercio entre los EUA y el 
MERCOSUR con el propósito de construir dos listas de productos (SA 6 dígitos), una 
expansiva (oportunidades comerciales) y otra defensiva (peligros comerciales), para cada 
uno de los países participantes en el acuerdo. El modelo teórico de referencia es el modelo 
de Grossman y Helpman de la economía política de los acuerdos de libre comercio. Se 
desarrolló una metodología original para la determinación de peligros y oportunidades 
basada en índices de especialización comercial e información de política comercial. Las 
asimetrías de tamaño económico han sido introducidas en el análisis a través de una 
implementación empírica de la tipología teórica de regímenes de protección (protección 
ampliada y reducida). Las principales conclusiones son: i) los productores agrícolas de 
EUA enfrentan peligros mientras que los productores agrícolas del MERCOSUR podrían 
tener oportunidades; ii) no hay oportunidades claras para los productores de EUA en el 
MERCOSUR (mercado reducido) mientras que los productores de manufacturas del 
MERCOSUR enfrentan peligros en el mercado regional; y iii) las oportunidades del 





This document considers an eventual Free Trade Area between the US and MERCOSUR 
with the objective of constructing two lists of products (HS 6 digits), one expansive (trade 
opportunities) and one defensive (trade perils), for each of the participants in the 
agreement. The theoretical model of reference is the Grossman and Helpman model of the 
politics of Free Trade Agreements. An original methodology for the opportunities and 
perils determination based on trade specialisation indexes and trade policy data has been 
developed. The economic size asymmetries have been introduced into the analysis through 
an empirical implementation of the regimes of protection typology provided by the theory 
(enhanced and reduced protection). The main conclusions are: i) agricultural producers in 
the US face a peril while agricultural producers in MERCOSUR could have opportunities 
(improvement in international prices); ii) there are no evident opportunities for US 
producers in the MERCOSUR (reduced size of the market) while producers of 
manufactures in the MERCOSUR face an evident peril in the regional market; and iii) 
MERCOSUR opportunities are concentrated in lighter manufactures.  1 
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Three successive summits of heads of state and government of the Americas, and six 
ministerial meetings, have established the terms for carrying forward and concluding the 
negotiations for the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which should 
come into force in the second half of the present decade. A renewed impulse has been given 
to hemisphere negotiations, which could mean a significant change in trade and economic 
relationships within the continent and also with the rest of the world. 
In international trade negotiations, a priority objective for the MERCOSUR 
countries is to improve their market access conditions in high income countries, so as to 
achieve better export performance. The new strategies are oriented to establishing 
preferential trading arrangements with the industrialized economies. The MERCOSUR 
countries are involved in various trade negotiations, among which those with the US stand 
out.  
One of the main benefits which the MERCOSUR countries expect from the FTAA 
process is to gain increased access to the big markets of North America. However, this 
process will also lead to a reduction in differentials in the regional trade preferences of the 
four MERCOSUR countries. The negotiations would result in important consequences for 
the foreign trade of each of the countries in the region and also for their economic 
performance, in function of their trade patterns, in particular those within the region and 
with the US. 
In recent months there has been growing skepticism about the likelihood that a free 
trade area will be constituted on the announced date. From the Initiative of the Americas at 
the beginning of the nineties, through the Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994, and 
up to the Summit of Quebec in 2001, the time invested in the negotiation process has not 
yielded definite results for the MERCOSUR countries. Market access to the US is still 
difficult, and the situation is worsening in some industries such as agricultural products. 
One illustration of this was the recent Farm Bill Law. The FTAA is turning out to be a very 
long negotiation process with an “infinite” agenda of issues (relative to negotiation 
capacities) and a big and heterogeneous group of countries (the 34 countries of the 
continent). The advantages of the FTAA strategy with respect to multilateral negotiation 
have not yet become clear. 
Up to now, the main output of the FTAA process has been the production and 
interchange of information, and the construction of a specific agenda of the many points 
involved in the negotiations. The large number of meetings and the interchange of 
information have had a positive impact on the countries in the region in terms of a learning 
process about new trade issues. For many countries in the region there is also a clear need 
to deepen structural reforms and build new domestic institutions in order to participate in 
the agreement.  2 
The FTAA negotiations have been carried on with a plurilateral methodology, but 
some signs of bilateralism have been evident, specifically some parallel bilateral initiatives 
from the US to individual countries or blocks.  
Unlike the European Union strategy, in which trade negotiations with other trade 
blocks in South America (the Andean Community and MERCOSUR) are viewed 
positively, the US has resisted this approach and prefers to negotiate in the plurilateral 
FTAA scenario or with individual countries (Chile and more recently Uruguay). There is a 
weak antecedent of negotiations with a block, the “Garden of Roses Agreement” of 1991, 
which is also known as the “4+1” agreement (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
with the US). The very name of the agreement is a sign of US resistance to recognizing the 
MERCOSUR (even after 1994 when the MERCOSUR crystallized as a customs union) as a 
single partner which could be party to bilateral trade negotiations.  
Without any doubt the most important and at the same time most complicated trade 
negotiation that the US has undertaken at the continental level is with Brazil. Brazil has 
shown real commitment to the MERCOSUR strategy, and it seems to lack conviction in its 
negotiations with the US, which would point to a weakness in the consistency of the 
regional trade block. For all these reasons, it is important to evaluate the resistance and the 
reciprocal opportunities that each MERCOSUR country and the US would have in the 
constitution of a bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA). In spite of the current lack of political 
realism, the evaluation of these forces is important. On the other hand, the likelihood of 
success in the trade negotiations currently under way is not high in any of the different 
scenarios where the reciprocal trade liberalization processes are taking place (multilateral, 
plulilateral and bilateral).  
The objective of this study is to construct two lists of products, one expansive 
(opportunities) and one defensive (perils), for each of the participants in the US-
MERCOSUR agreement. We argue that a government would have incentives to include in 
the trade liberalization agreement those industries on the opportunities list and to exclude 
those on the perils list.  
The general focus here is of a mercantilist type; it implicitly assumes that exports 
are good and imports are bad. In fact, it is known that, in terms of an evaluation of the 
effects on economic welfare, exactly the opposite is true. However, in trade negotiations the 
mercantilist focus is very often equally or more decisive than considerations of added 
welfare. Trade negotiations are in their very essence mercantilist. 
The idea is to identify the private interest groups that are for or against the trade 
arrangements between the US and the MERCOSUR countries. The importance of explicitly 
introducing the list of products to be excluded from the negotiations has been pointed out in 
the modern literature on the political economy of trade policy (Grossman and Helpman, 
1995). From this perspective, the exceptions list improves the chances of signing a free 
trade agreement (FTA) because it makes it more palatable in political terms. The general 
results of these models are summed up by the fact that the ideal exceptions list of each 
partner is like an index of the comparative advantages of the other. As Grossman and 
Helpman (1995) explained, the conditions needed for the political viability of a Free Trade 
Agreement may contradict those that ensure its social desirability. The industries with more 
potential for trade creation, for which the FTA implies an improvement in welfare, are 
those where there will be more resistance in the import substitution country to accepting 
their inclusion in the agreement.   3 
In a previous paper we applied this idea to the eventual trade agreements between 
the European Union and the South American countries, but we only considered perils to 
regional exports, and only studied the unilateral stances of the developing countries (see 
Vaillant and Ons, 2002). In this study, we extend the analysis by also considering the 
effects of the FTA in each domestic market. That is, we take into account a country’s 
production interests inside its own market, in the regional market (for the MERCOSUR 
countries), and the potential expansion of its exports to the new partner. We propose a 
general methodology, and we study the effects of the eventual preferential trading 
agreement on exports and production on both sides (MERCOSUR and the US). We suggest 
an industry typology of the effects of the FTA on trade inside MERCOSUR (the US) and 
on exports from MERCOSUR (the US) to the US (MERCOSUR).  
To sum up, our method consists in the analysis of trade flows and trade policy, and 
reaches conclusions about the unilateral stances of MERCOSUR countries and the US with 
respect to a bilateral FTA. A mercantilist perspective has been adopted, since it is the most 
pertinent from a political economy point of view. We explicitly include interests inside the 
US, and so we can analyze the position of the US government in relation to the agreement. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic and welfare 
effects of an FTA in the different cases classified according to the partner’s efficiency and 
its supply size. In section 3 a methodology for the empirical implementation of the previous 
typology is proposed. In section 4 the methodology is applied to the US-MERCOSUR 
agreement. Finally, section 5 contains conclusions.  
 
2. Economic and welfare effects of an FTA: typology of cases  
 
The production framework is specified as in a specific factors trade model
1. There are n+1 
industries in each country: a numeraire industry (0) that only uses the mobile factor (labor), 
and n other industries that use labor and a sector-specific factor
2. All goods are produced 
with constant returns to scale, and there are fixed endowments of all specific factors. Hence 
the assignment decision is only made for the labor factor. 
The consumers within each economy have identical preferences which are suitably 
represented by a quasi-linear utility function. Each individual is endowed with labor, and 
possibly with some sector-specific factor. The consumer receives a lump sum transfer from 
the government, which corresponds to the uniform redistribution of tariff revenue. 
The owners of specific factors are all organized in lobby groups, and ownership is 
highly concentrated in the population. From the political economy point of view, the 
relevant economic interests are given by the owners of the specific factor in a certain sector 
(the producers), who seek to maximize their own industry profit function, and those 
consumers who are only endowed with labor. 
The economy is small, and therefore world prices are given exogenously. Without 
loss of generality, all international prices (τ  i 
*) are normalized to one. Initially, the most 
favored nation (MFN) principle holds. The trade policy (t i 
z) is a set of instruments that can 
                                                 
1 The general analysis in this section closely follows that presented in Grossman and Helpman (1995), but we 
include a more explicit consideration of the traditional trade creation and trade diversion effects. 
2 The different industries in the economy are denoted by an index  i=0,1,....,n.  4 
directly affect the domestic prices (τ  i 
z) of export and import goods. The initial domestic 
price of any export good is one (the international price) while import goods may be taxed
3.  
Countries A and B exhibit the qualitative features mentioned above, and they are 
negotiating an FTA. In this context, the relevant cases are given by those products which 
are initially imported by at least one of the countries, subject to an MFN tariff rate different 
from zero. If both countries export a particular good in the initial equilibrium, then 
domestic prices are similar to the international price, and the trade agreement would have 
no effect on production, consumption or bilateral trade. In this case, the countries could 
compete in third markets. Without loss of generality, an industry is considered in which the 
following condition holds: τ  i 
A > τ  i 
B ≥ 1. That is, A is an importer of good i, while B can 
be a less inefficient importer (τ  i 
B > 1) or an efficient producer (τ  i 
B = 1). Three cases are 
distinguished according to the size of country B’s aggregate supply of good i: enhanced 
protection, reduced protection, and an intermediate case. In each case, two different 
situations are studied depending on production efficiency in partner B. The economic 
effects of the FTA on producer and consumer prices in each economy are derived, as well 
as the consequences for the welfare of the different actors and countries. 
 
2.1 Enhanced Protection 
 
For a particular industry i, the total supply from country B (xi
B) and the excess demand of 
country A (mi
A) are presented in figure 1. In this good, country B is small with respect to 
country A as a result of a relatively small endowment of the specific factor in B.  
 
Figure 1 
Country A’s import demand and country B’s total supply (small supply case) 
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At price τ  i 
A (the initial domestic price in A), the aggregate supply from country B is 
not enough to satisfy all the import demand of country A; xi
B(τ  i 
A) < mi
A (τ  i 
A). Therefore, 
under an eventual FTA, A has to continue importing from the rest of the world (ROW) and 
its domestic price remains unchanged. The producers in B prefer to sell in A’s market at 
                                                 
3 Thus, the domestic price (τ  i 
z) equals one plus the initial tariff rate on good i in country z.  5 
price τ  i 
A which is higher than that which they face in their own domestic market (τ  i 
B). 
Thus, producers in B divert all their production to A’s market, while consumers in B have to 
satisfy all their demand by purchasing from the ROW at the initial price. In conclusion, the 
only effect of the FTA in terms of prices is the increment in those paid to the producers in 
the more efficient country (see table 1 a)). Producers in B benefit from the higher protection 
granted to the producers in A (enhanced protection). 
 
Table 1 
Prices before and after the creation of the FTA 
 
Prices  Agent Country 
Pre FTA FTA 
a) ENHANCED PROTECTION 
Producers  B  τ  i 
B  τ  i 
A 
Producers  A  τ  i 
A  τ  i 
A 
Consumers  B  τ  i 
B  τ  i 
B 
Consumers  A  τ  i 
A  τ  i 
A 
b) REDUCED PROTECTION 
Producers  B  τ  i 
B  τ  i 
B 
Producers  A  τ  i 
A  τ  i 
B 
Consumers  B  τ  i 
B  τ  i 
B 
Consumers  A  τ  i 
A  τ  i 
B 
c) INTERMEDIATE CASE 
Producers  B  τ  i 
B  τ  i  
Producers  A  τ  i 
A  τ  i  
Consumers  B  τ  i 
B  τ  i 
B
  
Consumers  A  τ  i 
A  τ  i  
 
Country B is less efficient than the ROW (τ  i 
B > 1) 
 
This situation is presented in figure 2, which shows the aggregate supply and the aggregate 
demand (D) of good i in each market. In the initial equilibrium, the consumers in A satisfy 
all their excess demand for good i, Di
A(τ  i 
A) – xi
A(τ  i 
A), by purchasing from the ROW at the 
international price plus the MFN tariff rate. In the event of an FTA, the consumers in A 
import an amount xi
B(τ  i 
A) from B. So the only effect of the FTA in terms of A’s welfare is 
a tariff revenue (TR) loss that negatively affects the consumers in A, since, under an FTA, 
tariffs are not levied on imports from B (see equation I.1, Annex I). 
Country A’s welfare reduction corresponds to the area 1+2 in figure 2. This loss 
reflects the adverse effects of trade diversion (TD). In this particular case, an efficient 
producer from the ROW is substituted by a protected and less efficient supplier from inside 
the FTA. However, the amount of this welfare loss in country A depends on its own 
protection level, not on the efficiency level of country B’s suppliers (the protection level in 
B does not affect the size of the area 1+2).  6 
On the other hand, consumers and producers in B improve their welfare. The   
producers in B benefit from their preferential access to country A’s protected market (see 
equation I.2, Annex I). This increment in the profits of the specific factor owners in B 
corresponds to area 3 in figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 
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The consumers in B receive a bigger lump sum transfer as a result of the increment 
in the tariff revenue which is represented by area 4 in figure 2 (see equation I.3, Annex I). 
Under an FTA, initial domestic sales by country B’s producers, xi
B(τ  i 
B), are replaced by 
imports from the ROW, which remain taxed. 
 The total welfare improvement in country B is obtained by adding the gains of 
producers and consumers; areas 3+4 in figure 2 (see equation I.4, Annex I).  7 
From the point of view of the zone as a whole, the welfare loss in country A is 
bigger than the welfare gain in country B (see equation I.5, Annex II). The welfare loss of 
the zone as a whole is given by area 5 in figure 2. 
If the economic size of the zone is small, the changes in trade flows with the ROW 
have no effect on international prices. However, it is interesting to determine if the amounts 
traded with the ROW decrease or increase. ROW exports to country A decrease by the 
amount of: x i
B (τ  i 
A). ROW exports to country B increase by the amount of : x i
B(τ  i
B). The 
net effect is a reduction of ROW exports of the amount of:   x i
B (τ  i 
A) – x i
B (τ  i 
B) > 0. 
 
Country B is efficient (τ  i 
B = 1) 
 
If the international price equals the domestic price in country B, then the domestic market 
in B is not protected, and two kinds of specialization for the producers in B are possible: an 
“import substitution” industry or an export industry
4.  
The case in which i is an import substitution industry in B can be analyzed with the 
aid of figure 2. Area 4 disappears since τ  i 
B = 1 
5. That is, the MFN tariff imposed by the 
government of B on the imports of good i is zero (ti 
B = 0).  The welfare loss in A due to the 
reduction in tariff revenue remains the same. However, in country B only the producers 
improve their welfare, and the zone as a whole loses more than in the previous situation. 
The greater welfare increment for producers in B is not sufficient to compensate for the 
absence of an increment in tariff revenue. The reduction of ROW exports is given by the 
amount of: x i
B (τ  i 
A) – x i
B (1) > 0 (which is greater than in the previous case). 
In country B, industry i could also be an export industry. This kind of specialization 
could be obtained by starting from a situation like that shown in figure 2, and making a 
suitable displacement to the right of the supply curve of country B
6. In figure 3, the good i 
is exported by country B at the international price. 
In country A, the size of the welfare loss depends on the fraction of tariff revenue 
which is transferred to the producers in country B (area 1+2 in figure 3). In country B, the 
producers’ profits increase (area 3 in figure 3) while tariff revenue does not change. The 
welfare loss of the zone as a whole corresponds to area 5 in figure 3. 
When country B is an efficient producer and exporter, the amount of the reduction 
in ROW exports to country A depends on the amount that country A imports from country B 
in the initial equilibrium. The maximum reduction equals: xi
B (τ  i 
A) (country A does not 
import from B in the initial equilibrium). The minimum reduction equals: xi




B(1)] (country A imports all country B’s excess supply in the initial equilibrium). On 
the other hand, ROW exports to country B increase by the amount of: Di
B(1). The net effect 
is negative, and the reduction is between: [xi
B(τ i
A) – xi
B(1)] and [x i
B(τ  i 




                                                 
4 This is not the usual import substitution situation since the domestic market is not protected.  
5 And areas 3 and 5 are bigger. 
6 At price τ   i 
A, country B’s supply continues to be insufficient to satisfy the import demand of country A. 
Another way to obtain this specialization is by making a suitable displacement of the demand curve to the left, 
given the initial supply curve. In general, there are infinite combinations of displacements of both curves that 
satisfy the enhanced protection condition, and turn good i into an export for country B.   8 
Figure 3 
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2.2 Reduced protection  
 
Country B’s total supply and country A’s import demand for good i are presented in figure 
4, as in a reduced protection case. In industry i, country B is big with respect to country A, 
which is the price taker country.  
At the lowest initial domestic price (τ  i 
B), the aggregate supply of country B can 
satisfy all of country A’s import demand; xi
B(τ  i 
B) > mi
A (τ  i 
B). Then, under an FTA, A stops 
importing from the ROW and its domestic price falls to τ  i 
B. The producers in A enjoy less 
protection under the FTA than in the initial equilibrium (reduced protection). 
  9 
Figure 4 
Country A’s import demand and country B’s total supply (big supply case) 
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The producers in B are the only foreign suppliers in A’s market, and they also satisfy 
at least a part of their domestic market. The price paid by consumers in B for good i and the 
price obtained by producers in B remain unchanged at the level τ  i 
B. The price changes are 
summarized in table 1 b). 
 
Country B is less efficient than the ROW (τ  i 
B>1) 
 
Figure 5 shows the aggregate supply and the aggregate demand for good i in each market. 
There are three effects in country A: a reduction in profits for the specific factor owners; an 
increment in the consumers’ surplus; and a reduction in tariff revenue. The producers’ loss 
in country A, which results from the reduction in the domestic price that follows increased 
competition from inside the FTA, is given by area 1 in figure 5 (see equation I.6, Annex I). 
This price variation implies an increment in the consumers’ surplus, represented by the area 
1+2+3+4 in figure 5 (see equation I.7, Annex I). The consumers in A are also negatively 
affected since, under the FTA, all their imports originate in B, and therefore the tariff 
revenue in industry i falls to zero. The tariff revenue loss is captured by the area 3+5 in 
figure 5 (see equation I.8, Annex I). The net effect on consumers’ welfare in country A is 
ambiguous. The same occurs with the net effect on country A’s aggregate welfare. 
The analysis above can be developed in terms of traditional trade creation and trade 
diversion definitions. In this case, an inefficient domestic producer has been substituted by 
a less inefficient supplier from inside the FTA (trade creation), and an efficient producer 
from the ROW has been substituted by a protected and less efficient supplier from inside 
the FTA (trade diversion). The trade creation effect (TC) corresponds to the sum of areas 2 
and 4 in figure 5 (see equation I.9, Annex I), while the trade diversion effect (TD) 
corresponds to area 5 (see equation I.10, Annex I). The sign of the net effect on country A’s 
aggregate welfare depends on the relative sizes of trade creation gains and trade diversion 
losses (see equation I.11, Annex I). 
   10 
Figure 5 
Supply and demand curves of countries A and B in the reduced protection case with B 
inefficient 
 
   p i
A, q i
A 






              Market A 
τ  i 
A  
 
              1                              3 
         2                 4 
 τ  i 
B                                        5 
   1         
                          Di
A                                                
 
         x i
A (τ  i 
B)     x i
A (τ  i 
A)            D i
A (τ  i 
A)   D i
A (τ  i 




     p i
B, q i




                                                                                         
            τ  i 
A                                                                                              Market B  
              
            τ  i 
B               
  
                                                6  
                1       
                                                                                                                     Di
B 
 
                                                                                xi
B (τ  i 
B)   D i
B (τ  i 




On the other hand, the only effect of the FTA in terms of country B’s welfare is an 
increment in the tariff revenue which is given by area 6 in figure 5 (see equation I.12, 
Annex I). Country B has to import from the ROW the same amount that its producers 
export to A under the FTA. 
The welfare of the zone as a whole unambiguously increases (see equation I.13, 
Annex I): the losses in A (TD, area 5) are a fraction of the gains in B (area 6). That is, the 
joint welfare gain equals the sum of areas 2 and 4, plus the difference between areas 6 and 
5 (see figures 5 and 10). 
ROW exports to country A decrease by the amount of: m i
A (τ  i 
A) = D i
A (τ  i 
A) – x i
A 
(τ  i 
A). ROW exports toward country B increase by the amount of: m i
A(τ  i
B). The net effect 
is an increment of ROW exports of: m i
A (τ  i 
B) – m i
A (τ  i 
A) > 0. 
  11 
Country B is efficient (τ  i 
B = 1) 
 
Again, when the international price equals the domestic price in country B, two kinds of 
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The import substitution industry case can be analyzed with the aid of figure 5. Area 
6 disappears since τ   i 
B = 1 
7. In country A, the reduction in producers’ profits and the 
increment in the consumers’ surplus are greater than in the previous situation, while the 
tariff revenue loss remains unchanged. The welfare of the consumers in A and country A’s 
aggregate welfare unambiguously increase (there is no trade diversion in this case). There is 
no effect on country B’s welfare, and the zone as a whole gains more. The increment in 
                                                 
7 And areas 1, 2, 3 and 4 are bigger.  12 
ROW exports equals the amount: m i
A (1) – m i
A (τ  i 
A) > 0 (which is greater than in the 
previous case). 
The export industry case is presented in figure 6 and the results are almost the same. 
The profit reduction is given by area 1, the increment in the consumers’ surplus 
corresponds to the area 1+2+3+4, and the tariff revenue loss is represented by area 3. The 
consumers’ welfare gain in A equals the sum of areas 1, 2 and 4. The welfare improvement 
in country A equals the welfare improvement in the zone as a whole, and is given by the 
sum of areas 2 and 4. 
When country B is an efficient producer and exporter, the amount of the reduction 
in ROW exports to country A depends on the amount that country A imports from B in the 
initial equilibrium. The maximum reduction equals: mi
A (τ  i 
A) (country A does not import 
from B in the initial equilibrium). The minimum reduction is zero (country A only imports 
from B in the initial equilibrium). On the other hand, ROW exports to country B increase by 
the amount of: mi
A(1). The net effect is an increment of ROW exports between: [mi
A(1) – 
mi




2.3 Intermediate case 
 
Country B’s total supply and country A’s import demand for good i are presented in figure 
7 as in the intermediate case in which both curves matter in the determination of the 
producers’ price under the FTA (τ  i ). The relative sizes of countries A and B mean that 
neither A nor B can determine the new price by itself. 
 
Figure 7 
Country A’s import demand and country B’s total supply (intermediate case) 
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Only at the highest initial domestic price (τ  i 
A) can country B’s aggregate supply 
satisfy all the import demand of country A; xi
B(τ  i 
A) > mi
A (τ  i 
A) and xi
B(τ  i 
B) < mi
A (τ  i 
B). 
Then, under an FTA, A stops importing from the ROW and its domestic price falls to τ  i. 
The producers in A enjoy less protection under the FTA than in the initial equilibrium (τ  i < 
τ   i 
A) while the producers in B benefit from a higher price in A’s market (τ   i >  τ   i 
B) 
(intermediate case). The producers in B are the only foreign suppliers in A’s market and  13 
they do not sell in their own domestic market. The price paid by consumers in B for good i 
remains unchanged at the level τ  i 
B. These price changes are summarized in table 1 c). 
 
Country B is less efficient than the ROW (τ  i 
B>1) 
 
Figure 8 shows the aggregate supply and the aggregate demand for good i in each market. 
The constitution of an FTA has three effects in country A: a reduction in the profits of the 
specific factor owners, an increment in consumers’ surplus, and a reduction in tariff 
revenue. 
 
 Figure 8 
Supply and demand curves of countries A and B in the intermediate protection case 
with B inefficient 
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The producers’ loss in country A, which results from the reduction in their domestic 
price, is given by area 1 in figure 8 (see equation I.15, Annex I). This price variation  14 
implies an increment in consumers’ surplus, represented by area 1+2+3+4 in figure 8 (see 
equation I.16, Annex I). The consumers in A are also negatively affected by the total loss of 
tariff revenue in industry i, which is captured by area 3+5 in figure 8 (see equation I.17, 
Annex I).  
The net effects on consumers’ welfare and on A's aggregate welfare are ambiguous. 
This can be shown in terms of trade creation and trade diversion; the former corresponds to 
the sum of areas 2 and 4 (see equation I.18, Annex I), while the latter corresponds to area 5 
(see equation I.19, Annex I). Again, the sign  of the net effect on country A’s aggregate 
welfare depends on the relative sizes of trade creation gains and trade diversion losses (see 
equation I.20, Annex I). 
  On the other hand, there are two positive effects in country B. The producers 
increase their profits by selling more at a higher price (see equation I.21, Annex I), and the 
consumers benefit from greater tariff revenue since the initial domestic sales of B’s 
producers are replaced by imports from the ROW (see equation I.22, Annex I).  The total 
welfare improvement in country B is obtained by adding the gains of producers and 
consumers, areas 6 and 7 respectively in figure 8 (see equation I.23, Annex I). 
The welfare of the zone as a whole could increase or decrease depending on the 
relative sizes of country A’s losses and country B’s gains (see equation I.24, Annex I). 
Graphically, the zone welfare variation equals the sum of areas 2 and 4, plus the difference 
between area 6+7 and area 5 (see figure 8). 
ROW exports to country A decrease by the amount of: m i
A (τ  i 
A). ROW exports to 
country B increase by the amount of: x i
B (τ   i 
B). The net effect is a variation of ROW 
exports of x i
B (τ  i 
B) – m i
A (τ  i 
A) which could be positive or negative. 
 
Country B is efficient (τ  i 
B = 1) 
 
The import substitution industry case can be analyzed with the aid of figure 8. Area 7 
disappears since τ  i 
B = 1 
8. The effects in country A remain unchanged from the previous 
case, while only the producers improve their welfare in country B, and the zone as a whole 
is worse off than in the previous situation. The greater welfare increment for the producers 
in B is not sufficient to compensate for the absence of an increment in tariff revenue. The 
variation in ROW exports equals  x i
B (τ  i 
B) – m i
A (τ  i 
A). 
The export industry case is presented in figure 9 and the results are almost the same. 
The maximum reduction in ROW exports to country A equals: mi
A  (τ   i 
A). The 
minimum reduction is: mi
A(τ  i 
A) – [xi
B (1) – D i
B(1)]. On the other hand, ROW exports to 
country B increase by the amount of: Di
B(1). The net effect is a variation of ROW exports 
between: [xi
B (1) – m i
A(τ  i 
A)] and [Di
B(1)- mi








                                                 
8 And area 6 is bigger.  15 
Figure 9 
Supply and demand curves of countries A and B in the intermediate protection case 
with B efficient 
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2.4 Distributive welfare effects: comparison between countries and actors 
 
Table 2 summarizes the welfare effects of an FTA in the different cases for each actor 
(producer and consumer) and each country. 
In the enhanced protection case, consumers in A always lose, producers in B always 
win and consumers in B could win. Welfare in A always decreases and welfare in B always 
increases. In spite of the fact that the contribution of these industries to the welfare of the 
zone as a whole decreases under the FTA, they are very good candidates for inclusion in 
the agreement because no strong opposition is expected. 
  16 
Table 2 
FTA welfare effects 
 
Change in welfare  Agent Country 
B inefficient  B efficient 
a) ENHANCED PROTECTION 
Consumers  A  Negative Negative 
Producers  A  Nil Nil 
Total  A  Negative Negative 
Consumers  B  Positive Nil 
Producers  B  Positive Positive 
Total  B  Positive Positive 
Zone  Negative Negative   
ROW  Could be negative  Could be negative 
b) REDUCED PROTECTION 
Consumers  A  Negative or Positive  Positive 
Producers  A  Negative Negative 
Total  A  Negative or Positive  Positive 
Consumers  B  Positive Nil 
Producers  B  Nil Nil 
Total  B  Positive Nil 
Zone  Positive Positive   
ROW  Could be positive  Could be positive 
c) INTERMEDIATE CASE 
Consumers  A  Negative or Positive  Negative or Positive 
Producers  A  Negative Negative 
Total  A  Negative or Positive  Negative or Positive 
Consumers  B  Positive Nil 
Producers  B  Positive Positive 
Total  B  Positive Positive 
Zone  Negative or Positive  Negative or Positive   
ROW  Could be negative or 
positive 
Could be negative or 
positive 
 
In the reduced protection case, producers in A always lose, consumers in A could 
win or lose and consumers in B could win. The welfare effect could be positive or negative 
in A, while it could be positive in B. The zone as a whole always improves its welfare. 
However, in these kinds of industries there is potentially strong opposition to their inclusion 
on the list of liberalized goods (specifically from the producers in A). 
 Country  A's welfare improves, and the welfare of the zone increases more, when 
country  B is efficient. Figure 10 presents the welfare variation in the zone as a whole 
according to the efficiency level in country B.  
 
  17 
Figure 10 
Zone’s welfare improvement with reduced protection B inefficient vs B efficient 
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Finally, in the intermediate case some results depend on the particular values of the 
parameters. Producers in A always lose, producers in B always win and consumers in B 
could win. Welfare in B always increases. The effects on consumers’ welfare in A, on 
country A’s welfare, and on joint welfare could be positive or negative, depending on the 
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3. Methodology  
 
From the perspective of each of the participants in the MERCOSUR-US agreement, the 
FTA would mean a trade off between the gain in access to the new partner market and the 
loss in protection in those markets where the new partner improves its access conditions. 
The first can generate trade opportunities and the second can generate trade perils. In this 
section, we outline the methodology for the construction of two lists of products, one 
expansive (opportunities) and one defensive (perils). Thus, it would be possible to design a 
guide for trade negotiations between the US and the countries of MERCOSUR. This guide 
would establish expansive and defensive priorities at the level of products for each of the 
participants. The opportunities and perils analysis is interpreted in terms of the typology 
introduced in the previous section, based on the effects of integration in the different 
markets, in order to better identify the private interest groups that are for or against the 
agreement. With this outcome, the idea is to apply a political economy approach in the 
Grossman-Helpman perspective to analyze the political viability of an FTA between the US 
and MERCOSUR. 
Without loss of generality, we consider only two countries, A and B, and assume 
that these countries are going to sign a free trade agreement which could involve more 
participants.  
The methodology involves three steps; the first selects industries (SITC, 4 digits), 
the second selects products (Harmonized System, 6 digits) within the selected industries, 
and the third classifies the selected products
9. The first step consists in identifying the 
industries where the greatest contractive or expansive adjustments are expected due to the 
FTA creation (industries with high trade complementarity). Then, products are chosen 
taking into account the changes in trade policy which are implicit in the FTA, that is to say, 
those products for which the agreement means an improvement in preferential access to the 
other market (sensitive products). Finally, the selected products are classified according to 
the eventual expansion in exports (opportunities) and/or contraction in production (perils), 
establishing an explicit link with the three protection regimes defined above.  
 
3.1 Industries with high trade complementarity 
 
In line with the theoretical presentation, in each industry we should know which country is 
the less efficient producer, since, under an FTA, it is expected that this country will import 
products from the other in that industry. For this purpose, one option could be to compare 
domestic prices in both economies in each industry. However, the required level of data 
disaggregation for working with domestic prices is too high, the availability of price 
information is very limited, and consequently the statistical task is too great. For this 
reason, an indirect methodology has been developed using trade flows at industry level. 
The efficiency level of each country in each industry is inferred from revealed comparative 
advantage indexes. If one country has a revealed comparative disadvantage then it could 
potentially be more inefficient than the international economy, while if the country registers 
                                                 
9 The first step considers less disaggregated trade data due to a reason of data quality. Every step could have 
been developed at the same disaggregation level. The adopted approach could mean the mis-selection of some 
irrelevant products, but not the exclusion of the relevant ones.  19 
a revealed comparative advantage then it could be inferred that the good is produced at 
least as efficiently as in the international economy. 
We defined as industries of interest, those in which country A (B) is an exporter and 
country B (A) is an importer. This selection involves consideration of the export profiles of 
A (B) together with the import profiles of B (A). We consider the industries (SITC revision 
2, 4 digits) in which country A’s (B’s) exports show strong trade complementarity with 
country  B’s (A’s) imports. These are the industries that would have better chances of 
exploiting the eventual improvement in access to the new partner’s market. The industries 
of interest concept covers those in which the differences in the conditions of production in 
the two markets that are in the process of eliminating trade barriers are greatest. For this 
reason, it is logical to expect that these will be the industries where the greatest adjustments 
will occur, and at the same time these will be the industries that most oppose or support the 
trade agreement.  
Specifically, we use a trade complementarity index based on the “revealed 
comparative advantage” index of trade specialization proposed by Balassa (1965). For each 
industry, the trade complementarity index of the exports of A (B) in the market of B (A) 
equals the product of the export specialization index of A ( B) (comparative advantage 
index) and the import specialization index of B (A) (comparative disadvantage index). The 
export (import) specialization index equals the ratio between the share of the industry in a 
country’s total exports (imports) and the share of the industry in world trade. When the 
export (import) specialization index is greater than one, we say that the country is more 
export (import) oriented in that particular industry than the world average, and therefore we 
conclude that the country has a comparative advantage (disadvantage) in that industry.  
The industry set where country z is an exporter and country p is an importer, that is, 
the “high trade complementarity set” for the exports from z to p (HTC
zp), is defined as:  
 





zp MS XS S s i HTC  
with:     z= A, B     p = B, A and z≠p. 
 
Product  i belongs to industry s and S is the universe of industries. Two trade 
specialization indexes are used: XSs
z is the export specialization index of country z in 
industry s; and MSs
p is the import specialization index of country p in industry s. 
The global high trade complementarity set (HTC) is the union of the two subsets 
(
BA AB HTC HTC HTC ∪ = )
10. We have selected as industries of interest a subset of the 
industries with export trade complementarity greater than one: those industries that also 
satisfy the condition that export and import specializations are greater than one.  
At this point we should stress some shortcomings of the methodology that we are 
introducing: 
i) The methodology is limited when it comes to the precision with which industries are 
identified. These limitations could generate errors that we can classify in two groups, errors 
by defect (some industries that ought to be included are not in the selection), and errors by 
excess (industries included that ought not to be in the selection). In the first group, the 
                                                 
10 One country could have an export specialization and an import specialization in the same industry. That is, 
the intersection between the sets HTC
AB and HTC
BA is not necessary null.  20 
method does not permit identification of those industries where both countries produce with 
an import substitution specialization, but one of them is more efficient than the other
11. In 
the second group, a country could have a comparative disadvantage in one industry but 
produce in a way similar to the international economy. The second proposed filter, which is 
applied in the next sub-section, permits the solution of the second problem, that of 
including more industries than are wanted. 
ii) Some other limitations could stem from the fact that the methodology is based on 
indexes of comparative advantage that are of a "revealed" type. Thus, as has been typically 
stated, we are assuming that the real pattern of comparative advantage can be observed 
from trade data. In this sense, the indexes could be biased due to existing trade policy 
barriers, subsidies, geography, tastes, foreign direct investment, etc., all of which are not 
uniform across sectors and countries. However, we are still interested in the patterns of 
specialization, beyond the factors that are generating those patterns, since these indexes 
help us to map the private interest groups that are for or against the FTA.  
iii) The trade specialization indexes are biased by economic size. That is, bigger countries 
tend to have more diversified export and import structures, and therefore the share of each 
industry in total imports and total exports, and the average value of the index, tend to be 
lower. We tried to correct for this bias, performing OLS regressions of the indexes (one for 
export and one for import specialization) over economic size, and employing the 
corresponding residuals as the corrected trade specialization indexes
12. 
iv) We are not identifying those products that are basically exchanged on a regional basis; 
the type of products that do not travel long distances. In those cases, the opportunities and 
perils would not be relevant. 
The data source for this first step was the World Trade Flows (2000). Because of the 
structural nature of the variables involved in trade specialization, we computed the indexes 
for averaged trade data for the period 1990-1997 (1997 being the last year for which 
consistent information on the world economy is available). 
 
3.2 Trade Opportunities and Trade Perils 
 
Without loss of generality, and in order to establish a link with section 2, we define the 
trade opportunities for country B (the more efficient country) and the trade perils for 
country A. 
Trade opportunities refer to the potential expansion of country B’s exports as a 
result of the improvement in the access conditions to A’s market, while trade perils refer to 
the potential displacement of domestic sales of the producers in country A by exports from 
country B following that eventual improvement. In the case of our study, the US would face 
trade perils in its domestic market while the MERCOSUR countries would face trade perils 
                                                 
11 In those cases we are assuming that strong adjustments are not expected. 
12 In the case of the export specialization index the estimated equation was: 
   
z
s z GDP z GDP z
s XS ε + β + β = 2 ) ln( 2 ln 1 ln  
where GDPz is country z's gross domestic product (the average for the period 1990-1997). The sample used 
includes the countries from South America, North America, the European Union and South East Asia. The 
results are not significantly biased due to sample selection or the eventual endogeneity of GDP. The GDP data 
where obtained from the World Development Indicators (2001), World Bank.  21 
in the four regional markets (the “domestic market” for the member countries). The 
MERCOSUR-US agreement would mean a reduction in the differential in regional trade 
preferences with respect to US suppliers.  
The construction of the opportunities and perils sets requires the prior determination 
of what we call sensitive products.  
The selection of sensitive products involves completing the selection of the 
industries of interest with trade policy information and trade data at a higher level of 
disaggregation (Harmonized System, 6 digits). In the previous subsection, we applied a 
trade complementarity filter. Now we filter the HTC
BA set using information about ad 
valorem tariffs; it is a trade policy filter. Specifically, we consider that a product (HS, 6 
digits) is sensitive when the following multiple condition is satisfied: 
•  the product belongs to an industry (SITC, 4 digits) that is included in HTC
BA, 
•  country B exports the product, 
•  country A imports the product, and   
•  country  A’s imports of that product from country B face an ad valorem tariff 
different from zero.  
Thus, sensitive products are those that, being in HTC
BA, would gain improved 
conditions of access to the new partner market as a result of the constitution of a free trade 
area. On the other hand, the product is not sensitive when suppliers are currently faced with 











BA BA t M X SI s i SP  
 
where, Xi
B are country B’s total exports of product i; Mi
A are country A’s total imports of 
product i; and ti 
AB is the tariff rate imposed by the government of A on the imports of 
product i from country B
13. 
The additional data needed for carrying out the sensitive products analysis came 
from different sources. We used a database of US trade policy which includes the MFN 
tariffs (ad valorem equivalent of complete MFN rate) and all the current trade preferences 
granted by the US to MERCOSUR countries
14. These data were obtained from the United 
States International Trade Commission (USITC). The trade policy of MERCOSUR 
countries (the MFN tariffs which are those applied to imports from the US) were supplied 
by the LAIA General Secretariat. We averaged export and import data of the MERCOSUR 
countries, and of the US, at the HS 6 digit level for the time period 1996-1998. The data 
were supplied by the LAIA General Secretariat and the USITC, respectively. 
There is another potential shortcoming that we should mention. Since our analysis 
takes into account the universe of products, we could not pay attention to some very 
detailed aspects of trade policy that affect some of them specifically. This is, we are 
                                                 
13 There could be products which belong to an industry in HTC
AB but are not exported or imported. Those 
products cannot be sensitive. A reasonable alternative is to express the second and third condition as XC
k > X 
and MC
k > M where X and M are positive amounts of trade. This is also valid for the tariff condition, where it 
is possible to require ti
AB > t , with t being a positive tariff. For this specific study we required a tariff greater 
than 2%. 
14 The non-reciprocal trade preferences contained in the General Preference System (GPS).  22 
considering a simplified trade policy and, therefore, ignoring things like the existence of 
quotas, GSP requirements, etc.. 
The sensitive products turn into trade opportunities for country B when there is an 
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The sensitive products turn into trade perils for A when there is a displacement of 
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Taking into account these two definitions and the protection regimes introduced in 
the previous section, we observe that for a particular product the enhanced protection case 
means an opportunity but not a peril, the reduced protection case means a peril but not an 
opportunity, and the intermediate case means an opportunity and a peril. So it is possible to 
establish an explicit link between the two sections and to analyze the political economy 
consequences of the creation of an FTA in terms of the Grossman and Helpman model.  
The enhanced protection set when country B is the exporter (EN
BA) includes the 
products that constitute a trade opportunity for B and are not a trade peril for country A. 
 
{ }
AB BA BA PE i OP i s i EN ∉ ∈ ∈ =   and   /  
 
The reduced protection set when country B is the exporter (RE
BA) includes the 
products that constitute a trade peril for country A and are not a trade opportunity for B. 
 
{ }
AB BA BA PE i OP i s i RE ∈ ∉ ∈ =   and   /  
 
Finally, the intermediate protection set when country B is the exporter (IN) includes 
the products that constitute a trade opportunity for country B and a trade peril for country A. 
 
{}
AB BA BA PE i OP i s i IN ∈ ∈ ∈ =   and   /  
 
  The essential aspects of the methodology and its link with the protection regime 
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 Figure 11 


















         
 
                                                                                                        
 
3.3 The measure of the trade protection regime 
 
The protection regime after the FTA is determined using information about domestic 
production in each potential export country. The problem is that what is observed is the  
value of the domestic offer of B country (the more efficient) at domestic prices in B before 
the FTA, and the value of the excess demand in country A at the prevailing prices in that 
market before the agreement. Therefore, the observed ratio is the following: 
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The following relations should be observed, in order to determine the regime of protection: 
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•  Intermediate protection 
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It is not possible to observe exported domestic production valued at the domestic 
price of the import country (the denominator in relation (2)), nor the excess demand of the 
import country valued at the domestic prices of the export country (the numerator in 
relation (3)). Making some specific assumptions, it is possible to find the non-observed 
values as a function of the observed ones. In the case of the domestic offer in the export 




























= - is the relative efficiency of country A with respect to country B; 
B
si ε - 
is the elasticity of domestic supply in country B. 
 































) τ ( x ) τ ( D
) τ ( x ) τ ( D ε − +
τ − τ τ
= τ − τ τ  (7) 
Where: 
A
mi ε - is the import elasticity of country A. 
 
In conclusion, to find the values that are sought it is necessary to have estimates of the 
following parameters: domestic supply elasticity in country B; import elasticity in country 




4.1 Industries with high bilateral trade complementarity 
 
  Figures 12 to 15 present the HTC sets for US exports to MERCOSUR as a whole, 
and for the exports of each MERCOSUR member to the US. The coordinates of each point 
on the plane represent the trade complementarity levels of a certain industry exports in both  25 
directions. In all figures, the vertical axis is the same and corresponds to the HTC set for 
US exports, while the horizontal axis corresponds to the set of one of the MERCOSUR 
countries. Every industry represented belongs to the HTC set of at least one of the 
economies under consideration: a blue (red) icon is an industry in the HTC set of the 
corresponding MERCOSUR country (the US), while a black icon is an industry that 
belongs to both sets. The industries have been classified in four big groups: agriculture, raw 
materials, fuels and manufactures (a square corresponds to agriculture, a cross to raw 
material, a circle to fuel and a triangle to manufacture)
15. 
  The figures suggest a markedly inter-industrial pattern of trade since the industries 
are concentrated along the axes and there are few black icons, although there are rather 
more when Brazil is the MERCOSUR exporter. The limited presence of black icons means 
that the industries in which both sides, the US and the MERCOSUR, have simultaneously 
an export and an import specialization are rare
16.  
  In the case of Argentina, the industries included in the HTC set represent 
approximately one quarter of total exports. Almost 80% of the exports with high trade 
complementarity with the US market correspond to agricultural and fuel industries, with 
approximately equal shares.  
  Brazilian exports in the corresponding HTC set constitute nearly one half of the 
country's total exports, and manufacturing industries have the greatest share among the 
industries with high trade complementarity with the US market (more than 60%). 
 The  HTC set for exports from Paraguay to the US represents a low share of its total 
sales to foreign markets (approximately 10%) with a majority proportion of agricultural 
industries (70%). 
  In the case of Uruguay, the exports with high trade complementarity constitute 
about one quarter of total exports and are highly concentrated in agricultural industries, 
which make up more than three quarters in the HTC set. 
 Finally,  the  HTC set for exports from the US to the MERCOSUR as a whole 
represents approximately one half of total exports, and manufacturing industries dominate 
in the HTC set with a share of almost 90%. 
  The outcome from the trade complementarity analysis is also described by tables 3, 






                                                 
15 Agriculture includes SITC 0, 1 and 4 (food and live animals; beverages and tobacco; and animal and 
vegetable oils, fats and waxes; respectively); raw materials include SITC 2 (raw materials from agricultural 
origin); fuels include SITC 3 (mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials); manufactures include SITC 5 to 
9 (chemicals and related products; manufactured goods classified by material; machinery and transport 
equipment; miscellaneous manufactured articles; and commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere, 
respectively). The version of the SITC classification employed in this paper is that used by Statistics Canada 
(see Feenstra 2000). 
16 We are including preferential trade (intra-MERCOSUR and intra-NAFTA) for the computation of trade 
specialization indexes. In the case of the small members of MERCOSUR, the regional destination could 
represent a high share even for the exports of products where they are efficient producers.  26 
Figure 12 
US-MERCOSUR and Argentina-US: HTC sets 
Figure 13 
US-MERCOSUR and Brazil-US: HTC sets 
 











































































US-MERCOSUR and Paraguay-US: HTC sets 
Figure 15 
US-MERCOSUR and Uruguay-US: HTC sets 
 
 





























































4.2 Trade opportunities and trade perils  
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5, summarize the outcome of the application of the proposed methodology 
to the case of the MERCOSUR-US agreement. The columns show information by each 
country considered and consolidate the information for the MERCOSUR as a whole, while 
the rows give information about the different sets of products. The first section in all these 
tables gives total exports and the other sections give the subsets of export products that 
result from applying the filters and definitions included in the three steps of the 
methodology. That is, the products in the high trade complementarity industries set, the 
sensitive products set and the subsets of sensitive products classified taking into account the 
protection regime. 
The information available for domestic production in each country at product level 
rather limited the possibility of being able to differentiate the three protection regimes 
previously identified (see section 2 and subsection 3.3). For almost every relevant sensitive 
product, we were able to establish with precision whether it was a product in a reduced 
protection regime. Therefore, although it was possible to identify the group of products 
with expansion opportunities (they correspond to the products that are not under reduced 
protection), we could only establish a subset of the perils (see diagram 1). In other words, a 
product in a reduced protection regime constitutes a peril for the importer while a product 
in a not reduced protection regime (enhanced or intermediate) constitutes an opportunity for 
the exporter, and could be a peril for the importer
17. 
The global results are presented in table 3. Each set of products was characterized 
using the following variables of interest: share in total exports value, number of industries 
(SITC four digits), number of products (HS at six digits),  imposed tariff for this particular 
set of products, and the big industry division with the greatest export share within the set. 
For each group of products in table 3 the corresponding imposed tariff is computed. 
The imposed tariff is the weighted average tariff that the producers in one country face in 
another country’s market, the weights being the export shares of the first country. That is, 
we have the tariff imposed by the US on each of the MERCOSUR members, and on the 
MERCOSUR as a whole, and the tariff imposed by the MERCOSUR on US exports. This 
variable is a good approximation of the market access restrictions in each of the product 
sets. Naturally, the sensitive products are the ones which register the higher levels of 
protection. Brazilian exports in sensitive products are subject to the highest tariff 
restrictions on access to the US market. If we consider the whole MERCOSUR in relation 
to the US we arrive at an amazing conclusion: in spite of the fact that the average US tariff 
is considerably lower than the MERCOSUR level, if the sets of products that are important 
                                                 
17 For the classification of a sensitive product i into the reduced protection and not reduced protection sets, the 
tariff in the importer market (A) was used to proxy the relative efficiency of the importer with respect to the 
exporter (B) (ei
AB, see subsection 3.3). Then, considering this proxy and the import elasticity of the importer 
(ε mi






Finally, we compared the adjusted import demand with the exporter's total supply: τ i
B xi
B(τ i
B). If the supply is 
(smaller) greater than the import demand it is a (not) reduced protection case. In many reduced protection 
cases, B's exports were greater than A's imports, and therefore, we did not need production data (in particular, 
for products where the US was the exporter, and agricultural products exported by MERCOSUR countries ). 
We obtained some disaggregated production data from different sources: World Bank (Trade and Production 
Data Base), GTAP and IBGE. The import elasticities were those provided by GTAP.  29 
from the bilateral trade perspective are considered, then to attain symmetrical market access 




Results: type of products set of products by country 
 
Source: own preparation using data from LAIA, USITC and Feenstra (2000). 
 
The results obtained in the identification of each set of products are consistent and 
clear, so they validate the methodology. Unlike the global and synthetic objective of the 
computable general equilibrium models (see chapter III), in this case the details are 
relevant, we want to know which the particular products with expansion opportunities are, 
and which might contract their production levels. Each type of producer is associated with a 
different political position with respect to the trade agreement. From the perspective of the 
political economy model we have in mind (Grossman and Helpman, 1995), only producer 
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay MERCOSUR US
Value (mill $) 25187 52053 1034 2631 80905 680474
Industries (#SITC4) 470 468 254 393 478 482
Products (#HS 6) 4142 4250 499 1873 4731 5091
Imposed Tariff 4,7 5,55 3,04 5,87 5,2 9,89
B i g  d i v i s i o n  ( S I T C 1 ) 0720 07
Big division share (%) 0,38 0,24 0,56 0,46 0,27 0,52
Export share(%) 0,26 0,47 0,11 0,27 0,40 0,47
Industries (# SITC4) 46 85 19 36 123 134
Products (# HS 6) 323 799 34 204 975 1781
Imposed Tariff 5,12 7,24 8,25 6,03 7,34 9,42
B i g  d i v i s i o n  ( S I T C 1 ) 0700 07
Big division share (%) 0,38 0,27 0,68 0,76 0,28 0,62
Export share (%) 0,07 0,15 0,07 0,17 0,15 0,38
Industries (# SITC4) 23 35 4 17 75 129
Products (# HS 6) 86 168 19 96 304 1686
Imposed Tariff 15,53 21,55 13,11 9,13 18,58 11,66
B i g  d i v i s i o n  ( S I T C 1 ) 0000 07
Big division share (%) 0,48 0,32 0,77 0,77 0,38 0,57
Export share (%) 0,06 0,11 0,06 0,13 0,11 0,38
Industries (# SITC4) 20 25 8 7 33 129
Products (# HS 6) 47 61 12 16 80 1686
Imposed Tariff 16,99 26,57 13,73 7,98 22,21 11,66
B i g  d i v i s i o n  ( S I T C 1 ) 0000 07
Big division share (%) 0,53 0,44 0,87 1,00 0,50 0,61
Export share (%) 0,01 0,04 0,01 0,04 0,04
Industries (# SITC4) 10 19 12 40
Products (# HS 6) 25 64 6 80 160
Imposed Tariff 22,61 8,53 8,72 13,04 8,41
B i g  d i v i s i o n  ( S I T C 1 ) 7888 8











interests can, with political contributions, influence the government in the definition of its 
unilateral stance on the type of free trade agreement preferred. 
Our original conjecture when we set out to prepare this chapter was that, 
considering the asymmetry in market size between the two economies (MERCOSUR and 
the US), exports from the US to MERCOSUR would enter under a regime of reduced 
protection (US domestic production would be much greater than imports from 
MERCOSUR at the new prices prevailing under the FTA), but exports from MERCOSUR 
would enter the US under a regime of enhanced protection (imports from the US are much 
greater than domestic production in MERCOSUR at the prices prevailing under the FTA). 
The main characteristics of the political economy of an agreement based on the 
conjecture above could be summarized in the following group of stances: 
i) Export industries in MERCOSUR with sensitive products (MERCOSUR exports with 
trade complementarity and an expected increase in trade preference under the FTA) will be 
in favor of the agreement (MERCOSUR opportunities). 
ii) Import substitution industries and regional exporters in MERCOSUR, in sensitive 
products where the US is the exporter, will be against the bilateral FTA (MERCOSUR 
perils). 
iii) US producers will be indifferent to the FTA, they will not gain by it, but nor will they 
lose. 
iv) Consumers in MERCOSUR countries will gain by the effect of FTA liberalization, and 
consumers in the US will lose by the trade diversion associated with the increased price that 
MERCOSUR exports will have, and this translates into a loss of tariff income that is 
transferred to the smaller economy.  
These results can be characterized as an extreme case of the protection regime 
typology developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995). 
A first conclusion from a reading of table 3 is that the original conjecture is correct 
in the case of exports from the US to MERCOSUR. However, in exports from 
MERCOSUR to the US a sizeable subset of products could be entering under a reduced 
protection regime, and so those products would be perils to US producers. Therefore it is 
logical to expect opposition to the agreement by this group of US producers. In global 
terms, the possible FTA agreement between the US and MERCOSUR is basically trade 
liberalizing in both directions, but this does not mean that trade diversion costs will not be 
incurred in the export flows from MERCOSUR to the US in some manufacturing industries 
that will enjoy the protection of the bigger market, or that will eventually take advantage of 
trade reduction in the other market, as we shall see below. 
Tables 4 and 5 present the main industries and products in each set, respectively. 
The profile by type of industry and product allows deeper analysis of the phenomenon in 
question. In the case of the US, exports to MERCOSUR in the set of industries with high 
trade complementarity are concentrated in the big division 7 of the SITC classification 
(machinery and transport equipment). When the disaggregation level increases (see tables 4 
and 5), the described pattern of production is confirmed for the sets of sensitive products 
and there is reduced protection both at industry level (SITC, 4 digits) and at product level 
(HS, 6 digits). When it comes to industries, capital goods and telecommunications 
equipment stand out (see table 4). The star products in the US are transmission apparatus 
for telecommunications, and parts and accessories for transport equipment (see table 5).  31 
There are no products under enhanced protection in the case of the US, which confirms the 
original conjecture. 
In the sensitive products set that has the US as the importer, MERCOSUR exports 
are dominated by agricultural industries. In the subset of reduced protection, the export 
share of agricultural products is even greater. When the disaggregation level increases this 
pattern is confirmed, although some manufacturing industry exports which enter the US 
market under other protection regimes (enhanced protection or the intermediate case) could 
mean a peril for domestic production in the US. Among agricultural products under reduced 
protection those that stand out are frozen concentrated orange juice, unrefined sugar and 
tobacco (see table 5).  
Brazilian exports account for the largest share in these three products in 
MERCOSUR. In Brazil, however, manufactured products loom large among the industries 
under reduced protection, as can be seen in table 4, and in this respect the case of motor 
vehicles stands out because of their considerable export share. 
When it comes to agricultural products, the total production in Argentina, Uruguay 
and Paraguay justifies the assertion that a number of meat products should enter the US 
market under a reduced protection regime (see table 5). This is also confirmed when the 
aggregation is by industry (see table 5).  In the case of Argentina, it can be seen that in the 
motor vehicles industry there are various products that would be cases of reduced 
protection.  
With respect to the products that would benefit from protection in the US market 
without affecting it (enhanced protection) or partially reducing it (intermediate case), the 
outstanding industries for the MERCOSUR as a whole are textiles, clothing and footwear. 
For Brazil, rubber products are also important, and for Argentina some products in the 
motor vehicles industry are important.   
A comment is in order about the products under reduced protection in the US 
market in relation to those under reduced protection in the MERCOSUR market. In the 
light of the assumptions of the theoretical model of reference, we consider that the 
integrating region is small compared to the rest of the world, and therefore international 
prices are given. The assumption seems reasonable for those US exports that enter the 
MERCOSUR market under a reduced protection regime. However, this is not necessarily 
so when the exporter is the MERCOSUR. In this case, the increase in US imports that 
would result from trade barrier reduction could lead to an increase in the international price, 
which would mean a welfare improvement for MERCOSUR exporters. This could be the 
case in many of the agricultural products for which MERCOSUR exports have high trade 
complementarity with US imports, and the agreement would mean an improvement in 













Main industries by type of set and country 
 
 
Source: own preparation using data from LAIA, USTC and Feenstra (2000). 
 
 
SITC Export SITC Export SITC Export SITC Export SITC Export USimp SITC Export MSimp
0813 2160 0711 2541 2222 331 0111 344 0813 4466 168 792A 52367 1223
3330 1913 2222 2314 263A 178 6512 202 2222 3104 61 776A 40156 1359
7810 1312 0813 2229 0813 77 0422 194 7810 2884 84966 7849 28343 3243
3330 1913 0711 2541 0111 46 0111 344 0711 2542 3322 7849 28343 3243
7821 580 7849 1571 0011 15 8483 39 3330 1913 50648 7649 17493 3336
0111 574 8510 1427 6341 7 0344 37 7821 1847 15325 7284 13514 2251
7821 579 8510 1393 0111 46 0111 344 7821 1834 14952 7849 28343 3243
0111 574 7821 1254 1211 5 8431 23 8510 1424 13932 7649 17493 3336
1212 135 0585 1161 8423 5 8510 18 0585 1277 511 7284 13514 2251
0111 574 0585 1160 0111 46 0111 344 7821 1467 2564 7849 28343 3243
7821 422 0611 1070 1211 5 0585 4 0585 1275 418 7649 17493 3336
1212 135 7821 1045 0611 5 0611 3 0111 1201 1758 7284 13514 2251
7821 158 8510 1355 8423 5 8431 23 8510 1386 13883
8481 5 625A 404 6521 2 8510 18 625A 404 3461
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Main products by type of set and country 
 
 
Source: own preparation using data from LAIA, USTR and Feenstra (2000). 
 
HS Export HS Export HS Export HS Export HS Export US imp HS Export MS imp
270900 1913 090111 2538 120100 331 510529 202 230400 4195 7 880240 30809 509
230400 1907 120100 2314 520100 176 020230 194 120100 3104 61 854213 21831 629
100590 1280 230400 2215 230400 73 100630 182 090111 2539 2825 847330 18796 702
270900 1913 090111 2538 020230 21 020230 194 090111 2539 2825 271000 3991 2965
870421 373 200911 1133 010290 15 020130 77 270900 1913 50648 852520 5246 1391
020130 346 260112 1071 020120 12 020120 65 200911 1137 291 870899 11116 1115
870421 373 200911 1133 020230 21 020230 194 200911 1137 291 852520 5246 1391
020130 346 170111 1070 020120 12 020130 77 170111 1119 796 870899 11116 1115
020230 201 640399 1002 020130 11 020120 65 240120 1030 478 870829 7390 727
870421 373 200911 1133 020230 21 020230 194 200911 1137 291 852520 5246 1391
020130 346 170111 1070 020120 12 020130 77 170111 1119 796 870899 11116 1115
020230 201 240120 892 020130 11 020120 65 240120 1030 478 870829 7390 727
870431 153 640399 1002 620342 5 611010 9 640399 1005 5614
870120 5 401120 228 520812 2 640391 9 840991 373 2930
640610 5 401110 177 070200 1 620331 8 870431 264 9791





















Second product 34 
  Table II.1 in Annex II presents more exhaustive results with respect to the sensitive 
products aggregated at the level of industry. The industries are classified according to the 
protection regimes of their products, with information in each case about the volume of 
exports (in millions of US dollars), the imposed tariff and the number of products (HS six 
digits)
18. When the MERCOSUR is an exporter, the member countries with high trade 
complementarity with the US market are identified. The products in which MERCOSUR 
and the US have simultaneously export and import specialization do not seem relevant in 





Given the assumptions about political economy in the model, it was interesting in this study 
to analyze the effect that the possible FTA might have on producers’ interests. It was 
assumed that there are n specific factors in the economy, one for each sector. The 
ownership of these factors is very concentrated, so the objective function of each owner-
producer of a specific factor in each sector will be to maximize his net benefits from the 
contributions which he has to make to influence the decision which the government is 
going to take about how far to subscribe to the trade agreement (from not accepting it to 
subscribing to it completely with no restrictions). Therefore, from the point of view of the 
viability of the agreement, the only relevant interest to consider is that of the producers, 
acting either to defend their domestic market or seeking to export more to the new partner 
market. 
Denominations, definitions and an explicit methodology were established in order to 
identify each sector and product.  
For each country participating in the agreement, the industries in which that country 
would be relatively more inefficient (an importer), and those in which it would be relatively 
more efficient (an exporter), were determined. In this way, a first group of high trade 
complementarity industries was defined, those in which an expansion and/or contraction of 
production was expected to occur. An index of trade complementarity was used, and the 
specialization indicators of each country were adjusted to take account of the size of each 
economy. 
Then, at a level of greater disaggregation, the trade policy information was 
processed on the level of products so as to determine the sensitive products within the 
industries that had been identified. The collection of sensitive products was divided into 
two different groups: the perils and the opportunities. 
A peril for a particular country occurs when the concession of improved access to its 
market for a product in which the other country has a comparative advantage results in the 
displacement of production oriented to the domestic (regional) market. 
 An opportunity for a particular country occurs when the gain in improved access 
for a product in which this country is an exporter and the other an importer leads to an 
expansion in the domestic supply of the exporter. 
                                                 
18 In Table II.1, IT is the imposed tariff: ITMS (ITUS) is the imposed tariff faced by MERCOSUR (US) 
exports in the US (MERCOSUR) market.   35 
Given that, in the agreement being evaluated, one of the parties is a region made up 
of a group of countries, the only thing that has to be taken into consideration is that, in the 
case of the region-country, the region itself is considered as a domestic market.  
An explicit link between the perils and opportunities definitions and the protection 
regimes typology was established. An opportunity which is not a peril for the other party is 
associated with a regime of enhanced protection. A peril without a corresponding 
opportunity is a case of reduced protection. In the intermediate case, a peril and an 
opportunity co-exist. 
The discrimination of situations was done by comparing domestic offer in the 
exporting country with excess domestic demand in the importer, at the price which will 
prevail when the agreement is in force. The determination of the regime is a key factor for 
knowing the kind of distributive effects in each case, and in particular their influence on the 
objective function of the producers. 
To sum up, the political economy of an eventual agreement can be summarized in 
the following characteristics:  
- Agricultural producers in the US face a peril with respect to the constitution of an FTA 
with the MERCOSUR countries, while agricultural producers in MERCOSUR could have 
opportunities through an improvement in international prices due to liberalization and the 
resulting expansion in demand. In this situation, the cases of frozen orange juice, sugar, 
tobacco and meat of bovine animals stand out. 
- There are no evident opportunities for US producers in the MERCOSUR because of the 
reduced size of the regional market. US exporters enter under reduced protection 
conditions, and international prices should not be significantly affected as a result of the 
agreement. On the other hand, producers of manufactures in the MERCOSUR face an 
evident peril in their domestic market and for their regional exports. The machinery and 
capital goods industries stand out, as well as some sub sectors in the motor vehicle industry. 
- MERCOSUR opportunities, that is, those products that would benefit from protection in 
the US market, are concentrated in lighter manufactures in the footwear and clothing 
industries. 
That is to say, MERCOSUR producers in agricultural industries in which the zone 
has significant comparative advantages and in sub sectors of light manufacturing industries, 
would have opportunities and would face resistance to the agreement from MERCOSUR 
producers in the heavier manufacturing industries of machinery and transport equipment. 
Meanwhile, in the US various agricultural industries should be against the agreement. 
Although it is not determinant from a political economy point of view, in general, the 
consumers in both parts would benefit from the agreement given its liberalizing character. 
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Annex I 
Economic effects of an FTA: analytical expressions  
 
II.1 Enhanced protection 
 
•  Country A 










i x TR W τ τ − − = ∆ = ∆        (I.1) 
 
where  ∆  means variation; and Wi
A is the contribution of the industry i to country A’s 
welfare. 
 
•  Country B 
 













































− = = ∫ = ∫ = ∆    (I.2) 
where π  are the producers’ profits; and p is the producer price. 
 















i TR W ∆ + ∆ = ∆ π         (I.4) 
•  Zone (Z) 
 
















i x x W τ τ π τ τ      (I.5) 
 
II.2 Reduced Protection 
 
•  Country A 
 













































− − = − = ∫ − = ∫ − = ∆  
(I.6) 
 













































− = − = − = = ∆ ∫ ∫    (I.7) 
where S is the consumers’ surplus; and q is the consumer price. 
 








i m TR τ τ − − = ∆              (I.8) 
 


























i m S S TC τ τ τ τ τ τ π τ π − − − + − =        (I.9) 
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i m TD τ τ − − =         (I.10) 
 






i TD TC W + = ∆                                               (I.11) 
•  Country B 










i m TR W τ τ − = ∆ = ∆        (I.12) 
•  Zone 
 
































i TR TD TC W ∆ + + = ∆                                   (I.14) 
 
II.3 Intermediate case 
 
•  Country A 
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i m TR τ τ − − = ∆         (I.17) 
 




















i m S S TC τ τ τ τ τ τ π τ π − − − + − =    (I.18) 
 






i m TD τ τ − − =         (I.19) 
 






i TD TC W + = ∆                                                           (I.20) 
•  Country B 
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i x TR τ τ − = ∆         (I.22) 
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•  Zone 























































EXP IT CTRY #HS EXP IT CTRY #HS EXP IT #HS EXMS ITMS CTRY EXUS ITUS #HS EXMS ITMS CTRY EXUS ITUS #HS
0111 1201 8.26 A,B,P,U 6
0412 3593 5.00 1
0421 416 8.09 2
0422 613 10.96 2
0440 4890 8.00 1
0481 251 15.14 10
0542 341 5.00 9
0545 3 13.02 A 5
0546 591 13.38 15
0574 381 10.00 1
0575 375 10.00 1 12 2.67 A 197 10.00 1
0577 1008 10.00 13
0579 839 10.00 18 14 0.61 A 156 10.00 2 0 1.12 A 146 10.00 5
0585 1275 38.78 A,B,U 6 2 8.35 A,B 1
0589 30 14.00 3 44 32.51 A,B 231 14.00 7 7 6.17 A,B 88 14.00 3
0611 1119 25.48 A,B,P,U 1
0620 104 12.67 A,B 1
0730 48 9.97 B 3 5 20.42 B 1
1121 48 9.16 A 3
1211 99 42.44 A,B,P 1
1212 1030 53.07 A,B,P 1
1213 46 68.36 A,B 1
2331 1287 7.81 14
263A 2143 6.01 6
266A 947 11.55 19
2919 255 5.14 8
2929 213 7.29 16
3345 359 14.00 4
4113 473 6.02 6
4232 643 10.40 2
511A 2626 6.11 44
5121 941 9.82 25 91 19.60 A,B,P 282 15.09 5 0 3.86 A,B,P 87 2.40 1
513A 2356 8.41 59
514A 1606 9.35 25 198 5.53 B 733 8.49 9 44 5.02 B 1470 5.77 16
5161 694 5.27 13 9 5.53 B 38 4.17 2 36 4.50 B 224 6.89 1
5162 412 7.02 28
5169 316 11.73 4
5221 647 5.32 21 162 5.40 A,B 36 6.00 1
5224 220 7.81 12
5225 505 6.29 18 29 2.97 B 33 4.67 1
5231 1734 8.74 97
5239 173 5.86 10 12 3.29 A,B 74 5.64 1
5415 443 5.95 7
5513 830 12.97 16
5530 2710 17.99 19
SITC
MERCOSUR EXPORTER US EXPORTER MERCOSUR AND US EXPORTERS
REDUCED NOT REDUCED REDUCED MS REDUCED AND US REDUCED MS NOT RED. AND US RED.
US PERILS
MS OPPORTUNITIES
MS PERILS COMMON PERILS
MS OPPORTUNITIES, MS PERILS 
(EVENTUAL) US PERILS AND (EVENTUAL) US PERILS 41 
Table II.1 (cont.) 
 
EXP IT CTRY #HS EXP IT CTRY #HS EXP IT #HS EXMS ITMS CTRY EXUS ITUS #HS EXMS ITMS CTRY EXUS ITUS #HS
5542 1338 14.31 9
582A 4827 11.45 20
584A 711 10.18 10
591A 1631 12.72 5
5922 97 4.36 A,B 4
5989 8221 8.97 52
612A 25 5.15 A,B,U 1 65 9.36 A,B,U 2
6210 982 13.11 18
625A 351 13.61 10 404 3.70 B 2125 16.00 2
6282 59 14.00 5 17 3.79 B 69 14.00 3 4 4.36 B 46 14.00 1
6289 1182 13.56 10
6428 1205 14.37 11
6521 14 8.27 B,P 7
6575 3 8.96 B 2
6577 378 15.61 12
6584 166 9.94 B 5 19 9.38 B 7
6623 322 9.29 5
6638 101 13.94 10
6664 1 13.30 U 1
6665 26 8.84 B 1
6716 428 4.13 A,B 4 1 3.06 A,B 4
6811 516 6.66 4
692A 820 14.58 9
6931 289 14.00 3 11 2.04 A,B 21 13.76 2
6953 772 18.00 25
6954 1502 16.64 16
6996 531 15.60 10
712A 651 14.00 4
7133 455 14.00 3
7139 7545 16.41 8 373 1.94 A,B 2801 15.20 1
716A 3098 14.29 20
7188 367 14.00 9
7211 336 14.00 7
7212 1678 14.94 12
7213 87 14.00 3
7219 450 14.00 8
723A 7941 8.23 21
7252 257 11.45 5
7259 434 14.00 3
727A 658 13.25 11
7283 780 14.00 7
7284 13514 13.02 39
7361 1944 13.91 52
7369 1693 12.94 5
7371 187 8.50 4
7413 1865 13.82 23
7414 3838 14.87 11
7416 1792 13.67 12
742A 2593 14.03 11 154 2.50 B 392 18.00 1
743A 2477 12.46 7
7441 1037 14.00 8
7442 4547 11.16 30
7451 589 13.46 7
7452 2788 12.81 27
MS OPPORTUNITIES
MS PERILS COMMON PERILS
MS OPPORTUNITIES, MS PERILS 
(EVENTUAL) US PERILS AND (EVENTUAL) US PERILS
SITC
MERCOSUR EXPORTER US EXPORTER MERCOSUR AND US EXPORTERS
REDUCED NOT REDUCED REDUCED MS REDUCED AND US REDUCED MS NOT RED. AND US RED.
US PERILS 42 










EXP IT CTRY #HS EXP IT CTRY #HS EXP IT #HS EXMS ITMS CTRY EXUS ITUS #HS EXMS ITMS CTRY EXUS ITUS #HS
7493 902 14.03 3 38 4.50 171 16.00 1 12 3.71 B 493 14.13 3
7499 1366 14.30 13
7511 42 18.14 4
7591 1375 13.01 4
762A 1 4.37 B 1
7641 4904 11.97 8
7649 17493 8.77 28
771A 3236 15.86 11
7732 488 16.00 6
7742 1232 9.09 6
7752 741 20.00 6
7757 879 18.85 9
7781 1418 16.20 13
7782 702 17.19 9
7783 1980 17.47 13
7788 6073 13.04 32
7821 798 14.00 2 1467 18.99 A,B 1893 19.39 4 367 19.08 A,B 5988 20.00 4
7822 1099 17.08 11
7849 28041 14.75 15 156 2.00 B 240 16.00 1 0 1.07 62 9.57 1
792A 9 20.00 2
8421 15 18.43 U 7
8422 5 16.89 U 3
8423 5 9.50 P 2
8429 10 12.71 U 31
8431 23 15.23 U 7
8432 3 16.80 U 4
8442 21 7.40 B 1 0 6.60 B 5
8451 17 12.33 U 4
8471 3 6.68 U 8
8481 13 5.63 A,U 2
8483 56 4.00 A 1
8510 38 15.48 B 3 1386 9.02 B,U 17
8720 8240 10.63 14
8745 758 13.24 7
8748 13410 12.16 39
8749 2574 11.89 9
8813 1876 11.63 20
8822 2242 9.02 32
8921 36 11.82 4
8946 248 20.00 8
895A 831 17.07 21
8982 211 16.74 10
MS OPPORTUNITIES MS PERILS COMMON PERILS MS OPPORTUNITIES, MS PERILS 
(EVENTUAL) US PERILS AND (EVENTUAL) US PERILS
SITC
MERCOSUR EXPORTER US EXPORTER MERCOSUR AND US EXPORTERS
REDUCED NOT REDUCED REDUCED MS REDUCED AND US REDUCED MS NOT RED. AND US RED.
US PERILS 43 
Annex III 
Industries and products descriptions 
 
Table III.1 






0011 ANIMALS OF THE BOVINE SPECIES,INCL.BUFFALOES,LIVE
0111 MEAT OF BOVINE ANIMALS, FRESH, CHILLED OR FROZEN
0344 FISH FILLETS,FROZEN
0711 COFFEE,WHETHER OR NOT ROASTED OR FREED OF CAFFEINE
0813 OIL-CAKE & OTHER RESIDUES (EXCEPT DREGS)
3330 PETROL.OILS & CRUDE OILS OBT.FROM BITUMIN.MINERALS
0544 TOMATOES,FRESH OR CHILLED
0585 JUICES;FRUIT & VEGET.(INCL.GRAPE MUST) UNFERMENTED
0611 SUGARS,BEET AND CANE,RAW,SOLID
1211 TOBACCO,NOT STRIPPED
1212 TOBACCO,WHOLLY OR PARTLY STRIPPED
2222 SOYA BEANS
263A COTTON
3330 PETROL.OILS & CRUDE OILS OBT.FROM BITUMIN.MINERALS
612A MANUFACTURES OF LEATHERIOF COMPOSITION LEATHER NES
625A RUBBER TYRES,TYRE CASES,ETC.FOR WHEELS
6341 WOOD SAWN LENGTHWISE,SLICED/PEELED,BUT NOT PREPAR.
6512 YARN OF WOOL OR ANIMAL HAIR (INCLUDING WOOL TOPS)
6521 COTTON FABRICS,WOVEN,UNBLEACHED,NOT MERCERIZED
7139 PARTS OF INT.COMB.PISTON ENGINES OF 713.2-/713.8-
7284 MACH.& APPLIANCES FOR SPEZIALIZED PARTICULAR IND.
7649 PARTS OF APPARATUS OF DIVISION 76-
776A
7810 PASSENGER MOTOR CARS,FOR TRANSPORT OF PASS.& GOOD
7821 MOTOR VEHICLES FOR TRANSPORT OF GOODS/MATERIALS
7849 OTHER PARTS & ACCESSORIES OF MOTOR VEHICLES
792A AIRCRAFT& ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT AND PARTS
8423 TROUSERS,BREECHES ETC.OF TEXTILE FABRICS
8431 COATS AND JACKETS OF TEXTILE FABRICS
8451 JERSEYS,PULL-OVERS,TWINSETS,CARDIGANS,KNITTED
8481 ART.OF APPAREL & CLOTHING ACCESSORIES,OF LEATHER
8483 FUR CLOTHING,ARTICLES MADE OF FURSKINS
8510 FOOTWEAR
THERMIONIC,COLD & PHOTO-CATHODE VALVES,TUBES,PARTS 
Table III.2 









































880330 Parts Of Aeroplanes Or Helicopters, N.E.S. (Excl. Those For Gliders)
Description
Live Bovine Animals (Excl. Pure-Bred For Breeding)
Fresh Or Chilled Bovine Cuts, Unboned (Excl. Carcases And 1/2 Carcases)
Fresh Or Chilled Bovine Meat, Boneless
Boneless, Frozen Meat Of Bovine Animals
Tomatoes, Fresh Or Chilled
Coffee (Excl. Roasted And Decaffeinated)
Maize (Excl. Seed)
Semi-Milled Or Wholly Milled Rice
Motor Vehicles For The Transport Of Goods, With Spark-Ignition Internal Combustion Piston Engines, Of A Gross Vehicle Weight =<5 Tonnes 
Parts And Accessories Of Bodies For Tractors, Motor Vehicles For The Transport Of Ten Or More Persons, Motor Cars And …
Parts And Accessories, For Tractors, Motor Vehicles For The Transport Of Ten Or More Persons, Motor Cars And ….
Aeroplanes And Other Powered Aircraft Of An Of An Unladen Weight >15          000 Kg (Excl. Helicopters And Dirigibles)
Transmission Apparatus Incorporating Reception Apparatus, For Radio-Telephony, Radio-Telegraphy, Radio-Broadcasting Or Television
Monolithic Digital Integrated Circuits As Metal Oxide Semiconductor Circuits, Of Mos Type (Excl.Smart Cards)
Road Tractors For Semi-Trailers
Motor Vehicles For The Transport Of Goods, With Compression-Ignition Internal Combustion Piston Engines Of A Gross Vehicle Weight =<5 Ton
Uppers And Parts Thereof (Excl. Stiffeners And General Parts Made Of Asbestos)
Aluminium, Not Alloyed, Unwrought
Parts Suitable For Use Solely Or Principally With Spark-Ignition Internal Combustion Piston Engines, N.E.S.
Parts And Accessories For Automatic Data-Processing Machines Or For Other Machines Of Heading 8471  , N.E.S.
Men's Or Boys' Jackets And Blazers Of Wool Or Fine Animal Hair (Excl. Knitted Or Crocheted, And Wind-Jackets And Similar Articles)
Women's Or Girls' Jackets And Blazers Of Cotton (Excl. Knitted Or Crocheted, Wind-Jackets And Similar Articles)
Footwear With Outer Soles Of Rubber, Plastics Or Composition Leather, With Uppers Of Leather, Covering The Ankle 
Footwear With Outer Soles Of Rubber, Plastics Or Composition Leather, With Uppers Of Leather 
Wool, Combed (Excl. That In Fragments   Open Tops  )
Cotton, Neither Carded Nor Combed
Plain Woven Fabrics Of Cotton, Containing >=85 % Cotton By Weight And Weighing >100 G To  200 G Per M2, Unbleached
Jerseys, Pullovers, Cardigans, Waistcoats And Similar Articles, Of Wool Or Fine Animal Hair, Knitted Or Crocheted (Excl. Wadded Waistcoats)
Petroleum Oils And Oils Obtained From Bituminous Minerals, Crude
Lubricating petroleum oils or bituminous oils >70% (SITC 3345  )
New Pneumatic Tyres, Of Rubber, Of A Kind Used For Motor Cars, Incl. Estate And Racing Cars
New Pneumatic Tyres, Of Rubber, Of A Kind Used For Buses And Lorries (Excl. Tyres With Lug, Corner Or Similar Treads)
Oil-Cake And Other Solid Residues, Whether Or Not Ground Or In The Form Of Pellets, Resulting From The Extraction Of Soya-Bean Oil
Tobacco, Not Stemmed Or Stripped
Tobacco, Partly Or Wholly Stemmed Or Stripped, Otherwise Unmanufactured
Agglomerated Iron Ores And Concentrates   Ecsc   (Excl. Roasted Iron Pyrites)
Soya Beans, Whether Or Not Broken
Raw Cane Sugar (Excl. Added Flavouring Or Colouring)
Frozen Orange Juice, Whether Or Not Containing Added Sugar Or Other Sweetening Matter (Excl. Fermented Or Containing Spirit)